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Market Report
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Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$81.79
112.32
102.04
139.78
55.76
45.00
56.21
115.00
258.07
$100.00
131.19
112.92
170.52
83.19
       *
90.90
127.50
306.89
$92.46
134.25
117.00
156.70
75.01
      *
83.72
135.50
318.82
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.57
3.99
12.42
6.54
2.41
3.64
3.48
9.53
5.48
1.93
3.22
3.35
9.60
5.30
2.27
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
     *
     *
     *
132.87
49.87
135.00
92.50
67.50
112.50
36.00
150.00
82.50
      *
94.50
35.00
*No Market
Fifteen independent countries emerged from the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91. Aside from the
Russian Federation, the former Soviet Republics lie in four
geographic regions: the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia); Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan); the Baltics
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); and Eastern Europe (Belarus,
Moldova, Ukraine).
All of the new states faced daunting challenges in
making the transition from centrally-planned economies to
market economies. This transition was particularly
complicated because during the Soviet era, economic and
political decision-making was concentrated in Moscow,
Russia. Not only did the new countries need to develop
unfamiliar market institutions, but they also had to figure
out how to govern themselves as independent countries. In
the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union for
example, agricultural output declined on average by 25-50
percent across the fifteen countries (Liefert and Swinnen,
2002). Economic and political conflicts among the new
states shifted from being internal issues dealt with by the
Soviet authorities in Moscow, to international problems
between the newest members of the United Nations. The
current conflict in Kyrgyzstan between the Kyrgyz majority
and the minority Uzbek population is an illustration of the
continuing tensions among these former Soviet Republics.
The post Soviet countries have many similarities
including widespread use of the Russian language,
corruption, political instability, bureaucratic inertia,
poverty, income inequalities, involvement by international
organizations and other countries, and ongoing ethnic and
religious conflicts. Many of these factors slow economic
development, trade and growth in the regions. In the
Caucasus, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region located within
Azerbaijan's boundaries but populated mainly by
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Armenians, resulted in border closings that eliminated all
trade between the two countries. In Eastern Europe, the
disputed region of Transdinestria, populated mainly by
ethnic Russians but lying between Ukraine and Moldova,
has been the source of tensions between Russia and
Moldova. Another conflict is taking place between Russia
and Georgia, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions
in Georgia which have been recognized as independent
republics by Russia, but not by Georgia or by most of the
international community. Relations between Russia and
Georgia deteriorated to the point that the Russian army
actually invaded Georgia in 2008 in response to alleged
provocations by the Georgian government (Klare, 2008). 
Even before the armed conflict, relations between
Georgia and Russia had been uneasy, in part because of
the Rose Revolution that followed flawed presidential
elections in 2003. This led to the establishment of a
strongly pro-Western government (Kandelaki, 2006). In
2006, Russia decided to ban imports of wine from
Georgia, which has long been known for its high quality
wine (BBC News, 2006). Wines from Georgia and another
former Soviet Republic, Moldova, were popular all over
the Soviet Union, and Russia has traditionally imported
large amounts of wine from these countries. The Russian
government claimed that the reason for the ban was
because the wines contain heavy metals and pesticides, a
claim that was disputed by Georgian and Moldovan
authorities (Chivers, 2006). Russian authorities also
argued that the wines do not meet Russian consumers’
standards. Wine production is very important for both the
Georgian and Moldovan economies. For both countries
Russia was the primary wine market, accounting for as
much as 90 percent of their wine exports (BBC News,
2006). Overall, wine is the second largest export product
for Georgia (about 10 percent of total exports), and for
Moldova, wine production constitutes about 25 percent of
its GDP (Tsereteli, 2006). According to the 2007 Georgian
Economic Report, the share of wine in total export
earnings fell from 7.5 to 4.1 percent as a result of the
Russian ban. For Russia, Georgian wine made up about
nine percent of total wine imports, while Moldovan wine
accounted for about 56 percent (Tsereteli, 2006). These
numbers show that Russian wine consumers (and retailers)
were also penalized by the ban, which led to sharp price
increases. In 2007, Russia suspended the ban on Moldovan
wine (but not on Georgian wine).
The Russian ban on imports of Georgian wine is an
effort to achieve geopolitical ends by inflicting economic
harm on Georgia. There is a long history of similar
actions. For example, to punish the Soviet Union for
invading Afghanistan, the United States boycotted the
1980 Moscow Olympics and put an embargo on
agricultural exports to the Soviet Union. The United States
has tried to punish Cuba for many years by imposing a
trade embargo. In general, the use of economic sanctions
as part of a country’s international political and diplomatic
strategy has been ineffective. U.S. sanctions on trade with
Cuba have probably strengthened the hand of Fidel Castro,
who could point to the U.S. trade measures as an
explanation for the backward state of Cuba’s economy,
rather than being forced to confront the deficiencies of his
communist government’s economic strategies.
The impact of Russia’s ban on wine imports can be
seen in Table 1 (on next page). Prior to the Russian action,
trade in wine in all three countries was growing rapidly.
For the period 2000 to 2005, average annual growth of
Georgian and Moldovan wine exports and Russian wine
imports was 25, 19 and 27 percent, respectively. In 2007,
wine exports were 77 percent below the high reached in
2005 in Georgia, and 74 percent lower in Moldova. Russian
wine imports did not fall as much, as there are many
alternative sources for wine, but they were still 36 percent
below the 2005 high. It is likely that Moldovan exports
increased after the withdrawal of the ban in 2007, although
data for subsequent years are not yet available. In Georgia
however, the loss of the Russian market has forced wine
producers to seek new outlets in a world wine market that
is already very competitive, and dominated by sophisticated
producers and merchants in Europe, Australia, South
America and elsewhere. Traditionally, Russia has been
Georgia’s primary trading partner for a wide range of
products, many of which were also affected by the Russian
embargo. This has caused significant harm to the Georgian
economy. On the other hand, Georgia is looking for new
markets and is currently increasing trade with Turkey and
Azerbaijan.
Have Russia’s economic sanctions directed at Georgia
achieved the geopolitical goals of the Russian leadership?
This question is complicated by the fact that Russia’s
precise objectives have never been clearly articulated.
Klare argues that the current conflict between Russia and
Georgia is just one element in “... an intense geopolitical
contest over the flow of Caspian Sea energy to markets in
the West.” To prevent Russia from exercising complete
control over the delivery of oil and natural gas to Europe,
U.S. Presidents Clinton and Bush both supported the
construction of a pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey, and directed substantial amounts of military aid to
Georgia to protect these investments (Klare, 2008). The
pipeline has been in operation since 2006, so it is not clear
that the Russian economic sanctions have had much of an
impact on what may be the underlying conflict, control of
energy resources in areas that were previously part of the
Soviet Union. Overall, Russia’s attempt to control and
punish Georgia might result in pushing Georgia towards the
West even more.
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Table 1: Georgian and Moldovan Wine Exports and Russian Wine Imports (metric tons), 2000-2007. 
Year Georgian Wine Exports  Moldovan Wine Exports  Russian Wine Imports      
2000 18,430 99,183 162,346
2001 21,612 136,799 256,615
2002 23,399 153,656 298,380
2003 34,706 202,170 416,361
2004 40,047 228,036 505,125
2005 64,994 254,187 622,702
2006 24,540 146,083 369,977
2007 14,840 66,062 399,595
Source: http://faostat.fao.org/site/406/default.aspx 
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